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TRANSPARENT VERIDICALITY AND
PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMPOSTERS:
THE TELLING ISSUE
Robert Oakes

Can there be veridical states of "mystical-union" such that their being
veridical would be transparent to their phenomenological subjects?
Epistemologists of religious belief have generally greeted this extraordinary thesis with much disdain. The aim of this essay is to establish that the
Doctrine of Transparent Veridicality (the DTV) is eminently (if surprisingly)
defensible. Central to our argument for its tenability is a nontraditional and
much-neglected conception of "mystical union." I hope to establish that no
veridical state of mystical union-according to the relevant conceptioncould conceivably be nonveridical or have a phenomenological imposter, and,
accordingly, that the veridicality of any such mystical state can plausibly be
regarded as transparent to its phenomenological subject. Thus, our conclusion is that the DTV is rationally respectable.

Mysticism is an eruption of the absolute into history. Like music, it is the crowning of culture, its ultimate justification.
- (E.M. Cioran, Tears and Saints)
I

In one of his classical works on mystical theology,t Thomas Merton maintains that nothing other than God
can produce even a plausible imitation of true mystical union.
Imitations are of course foisted upon souls, and sometimes with great
success. But...anyone who has experienced true mystical union can
see at once the infinite distance that lies between it and the false article ...
Thus, Merton embraces the intriguingly audacious-not to say radicaldoctrine that there can be mystical (nonsensory, "transcendental") perceptions 2 of God's Presence the veridicality of which would be immediately
apparent to their respective phenomenological subjects, i.e., to their respective phenomenological subjects who are rational and attentive. More
specifically and more strongly, Merton maintains that, with respect to true
mystical union (to borrow his expression), no perception of that sort could
fail to be such that its veridicality would be immediately apparent to its
phenomenological subject. Let us call this "the Doctrine of Transparent
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Veridicality" (the "DTV").
While what may broadly be called the "religious experience argument"
for the existence of God has been defended with remarkable adroitness in
recent years,3 epistemologists of religious belief-many of whom are theists, of course-have generally been disdainful of the notion that there can
be veridical mystical states such that their being veridical rather than deceptive
(or nonveridical) would be immediately apparent to their phenomenological
subjects. 4 Analytic philosophers of religion have, for the vast most part,
been conspicuously unsympathetic to (any version of) the DTV.
My aim in what follows is to demonstrate that the DTV-however surprising or counterintuitive many may take this to be-is amenable to
philosophical vindication. 5 This is hardly to suggest anything so quixotic as
that our argument to be elaborated can properly be taken to entail the truth
of the DTV. Nonetheless, the thesis I am out to defend is not exactly modest. That is, the conclusion I shall be working towards is that the DTV is not
just a doctrine for which there is concephlal space within the epistemology of
religious experience, but, more strongly, is a doctrine that is rationally
respectable. Specifically, I hope to establish the defensibility of the following:
any veridical state of mystical union would be such that its veridicality was
transparent to its phenomenological subject. As will be seen, a defense of a
nontraditional-and, as it seems to me, unjustly under-developed or
improperly ignored-theory of mystical union constitutes a key component of our overall argument. First, however, we need to attend to the
abiding and seemingly intractable question of how to tell the difference
between veridical perceptual states and deceptive perceptual states.
II

How are we able to tell, concerning any of our perceptual states, that it is in
fact veridical rather than deceptive, i.e., that it actually reveals what it ostensibly reveals? When this question is considered from a rigorous or strictly
philosophical "point of view," the appeal of classical perceptual skepticism
is hardly mysterious. Consider: I am perfectly confident of being able to tell
that there is presently an olive on the kitchen floor: that my relevant sensory state reveals to me that this is so. Accordingly, I am perfectly confident
that the perceptual state in question is veridical. However, to allow for the
moment that this sensory state is veridical, it seems critically important to
discriminate between my ability to "tell" in the ordinary or prosaic sense-in the sense of for all practical purposes--that there is presently an olive on
the kitchen floor and my ability to tell in the epistemically definitive or
infallible sense that this state of affairs obtains. While it seems proper to
maintain that I am able to "tell" in the prosaic sense that there is an olive on
the kitchen floor, the view that I am able to tell infallibly that this is so, i.e.,
that my warrant for accepting this proposition is infallible, seems very difficult to defend. However, the philosophically rigorous conception of knowledge requires my inability to know that there is an olive on the kitchen floor
unless I can tell infallibly that this state of affairs obtains. As pointed out by
Barry Stroud/
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Why do we find it so natural when philosophizing to hold that in order
to know or to be certain of something we must know or be certain
that no conceivable possibilities obtain which are such that, if they
obtain then we do not know what we thought we did ... ? We do not
in fact insist on that in everyday life, even in important scientific or
legal matters; so why do find it so obvious when we think philosophically about human knowledge?
Along this very line, David Lewis 7 contends that, notwithstanding everyday contexts in which we take it to be unproblematic that we know a great
deal, the Skeptical Argument has considerable merit:
It seems as if knowledge must be by definition infallible. If you claim
that S knows that p, and yet you grant that S cannot eliminate a certain possibility in which [-p], it certainly seems as if you have granted that S does not after all know that p. To speak of fallible knowledge, of knowledge despite uneliminated possibilities of error, just
sounds contradictory.
It seems to me that there is considerable insight in these reflections on
knowledge and infallibilism. To begin with, it seems analytically undeniable that it cannot be epistemically definitive for S that p if S's warrant for
accepting p is consistent with the truth of -po Hence, if Lewis is correct in
maintaining that the notion of "fallible knowledge" gives profound indication of being conceptually disordered, then, unless we are able to tell infallibly that our perceptual states--()r at least some of them-are veridical, the
best that they can provide us with is reasonable belief not "fallible" knowledge. It seems to me that Lewis is exactly right to call into question the conceptual propriety of the idea of "fallible knowledge," and, accordingly, that
the bifurcation sometimes made between knowing simpliciter and knowing
for certain constitutes a "distinction without a difference."R (Here, of course,
the salient cases are those wherein the accepted proposition meets the
truth-condition for knowing, i.e., wherein p is true. There is obviously no
possibility of fallible knowledge in any case in which p is false.)
However, since it is largely extraneous to our central concern, we need
not devote further space to the issue-albeit interesting and significant--()f
whether there can be bona fide knowledge in the absence of infallible warrant. Rather, the question of moment is clearly this: can there be perceptual
states-whether sensory or mystical-such that that their phenomenological subjects would be able to tell infallibly that they are veridical? If there is
persuasive reason for holding that the answer to this question is No, i.e.,
that we are limited to being able to tell that our veridical perceptual states
are veridical only in the prosaic sense of being able to tell that they are for
all practical purposes, then, of course, there is persuasive reason for maintaining that there cannot be perceptual states-sensory or mystical-the
veridicality of which would be transparent to their phenomenological subjects. Hence, we need now to tum our attention to a postulate that has long
been embraced by a significant majority of epistemologists of perception,
and which, if true, spells very serious trouble for the DTV. It can properly
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be called "the Phenomenological Indiscernibility Postulate" (the "PIP").
III

According to the PIP, any perceptual state that is actually veridical is conceivably deceptive. Accordingly, no veridical perceptual state could be such
that its veridicality was entailed by its phenomenological content, i.e., any
perceptual state that is veridical could be precisely the perceptual state that
it is and be deceptive. Thus, a requirement of the PIP is that veridicality can
never constitute an intrinsic property of a veridical perceptual state.
William Alston endorses the PIP as follows: 9
Delusory experiences can be phenomenologically indistinguishable
from veridical ones, in the mystical realm as well as the sensory.
Richard Gale renders it this way:lO
Certainly the very same phenomenological-intentional state that is
realized in a veridical mystical state could be realized in an unveridical one.
Hence, the PIP requires that there is no such thing as a perceptual state that
is in fact veridical but lacks a phenomenological imposter. For example, allowing that my sensory state consisting in (roughly) "olive-now-on-thekitchen-floor" is actually veridical, its phenomenological imposter would
be a deceptive perceptual state that is phenomenologically identical to this
veridical perceptual state.
Accordingly, the PIP spells very bad news for the DTV since it surely
precludes our ability to tell infallibly that any perceptual state of ours is in
fact veridical. Consider: even allowing that the perceptual state which I
take to reveal to me the presence of an olive on the kitchen floor is veridical,
it could nonetheless-according to the PIP-have precisely the phenomenological character that it does and be deceptive, i.e., have precisely the phenomenological character that it does and constitute a phenomenological
imposter. In which case, of course, it would fail to reveal to me the presence
of an olive on the kitchen floor. Accordingly, this veridical perceptual state
can hardly provide me with epistemically definitive foundation for believing that there is presently an olive on the kitchen floor.l] Thus, it seems
abundantly clear that-mystical states being perceptual states-there can
be no veridical mystical states the veridicality of which would be transparent
to their phenomenological subjects unless there can be veridical mystical
states to which the PIP would not apply. Thus, the telling question: is it rational to hold that there can be veridical mystical states to which the PIP does
not apply? Alternatively, is it rational to maintain that there can be veridical mystical states that could not conceivably be phenomenologically identical to any deceptive mystical states, i.e., veridical mystical states that could
have no phenomenological imposters? It seems to me that the answer to this
question is Yes.
First, however, it should be pointed out that the PIP can readily be con-

TRANSPARENT VERIDICALITY

417

strued as a modal tenet de re: as the postulate that there can be no veridical
perceptual states to which veridicality was essential. Rather, the PlP
requires that veridicality (or being veridical) is a property that can be possessed only accidentally-nonessentially-by perceptual states. (Thus, the
PIP requires that the conditional property ifveridical then veridical accidentally
is exemplified by all perceptual states essentially.) Accordingly, while
there are countless propositions that are true essentially, no perceptual
states-if the PIP is correct--<:an be veridical essentially. Hence, since it is
obvious that any veridical mystical state to which veridicality was accidental could conceivably be a phenomenological imposter, accidental veridicality rules out transparent veridicality. This being so, no argument on behalf of
lhe DTV can be plausible if it fails to provide ample justification for the
view that there can be veridical mystical states to which veridicality was
essential. For unless we have adequate warrant for maintaining that there
can be veridical mystical states which lacked phenomenological imposters,
and, accordingly, veridical mystical states that would not be subject to the
PlP, it is hard to see just how it could be shown that the DTV is rationally
respectable. Hence, our very next order of business is to establish that there
is adequate warrant for holding that there can be veridical mystical states
to which veridicality was essential: veridical mystical states that could not
conceivably be phenomenological imposters. Once that is achieved, we
will be positioned to establish the rational respectability of the DTV.
lV

How shall we understand mystical union? What does it consist in?
Intriguingly, it has been the tendency of many distinguished mystics from
both the Jewish and Christian traditions to characterize what they take to
be their episodes of mystical union in metaphysically extreme fashion,12 i.e.,
in ways which-if taken literally-give profound indication of compromising the canonically central tenet that there is a conceptually unbridgeable
ontological separateness of Creator from creature. That is, the extreme
accounts in question maintain or imply-once again, if taken literallythat, in the throes of mystical union, the relevant finite self is fully absorbed
within the Limitless Plenitude Who is God in precisely the way that drops
of water are fully absorbed into the ocean. 13 Clearly, this extreme or radical
conception lends itself remarkably well to the famous characterization of
authentic mystical union as "undifferentiated unity."
Intriguingly, what can be seen right off is that, independently of any
considerations having to do with canonical theism, there is something
remarkably odd about the "extreme" conception of mystical union. That
is, there could not conceivably be phenomenological warrant for the view
that one's self is (literally) annihilated in the course of veridical mystical
union. Since the existence of the self-i.e., of a finite center of consciousness-clearly constitutes a necessary condition for its ability to detect anything, how could it be conceptually possible for an obliterated self to detect
"its" nonexistence? However, our distinguished Catholic mystics introduce important qualifications which make it clear that their heightened
language in this regard is somewhat hyperbolic, i.e., is not to be taken lit-
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erally. Ruysbroeck puts it this way:'4
... no created essence can become one with God's essence and pass
away from its own substance. For so the creature would become
God, which is impossible; for the Divine Essence can neither wax nor
wane nor can anything be added to It nor taken from It.
According to Saint John of the Cross,15 what actually takes place in cases of
veridical mystical union can properly and fruitfully be compared to what
occurs when a ray of sunlight strikes a window that is "wholly pure and
clean:" In such a case,
the ray of sunlight will transform it and illumine it in such wise that
it will itself seem to be a ray .. .in reality the window has a nature distinct from that of the ray itself ... yet we may say that that window is a
ray of the sun or is light by participation.
Likewise, in the case of mystical union, the relevant pure or stain-free
receptive soul
.. .is at once illumined and transformed in God and communicates to
it His supernatural Being, in such wise that. .. the soul seems to be
God rather than a soul, and is indeed God by participation; although it
is true that its natural being, though thus transformed, is as distinct

from the Being of God as it was before ...'6
Finally, here is Merton's rendition of this point: '7
... a contingent and finite substance can never become one nature and
substance with the infinite and Absolute Being of God ... the metaphysical impossibility of this is evident from the very notion of a
substance being "changed into" what is, by nature, unchanging. We
cannot "become God." God is, and His Being is infinitely above all
becoming. But by His free gift He can make us participate by knowledge and love in everything that is His by nature.
It seems to me that this notion, stressed by both John of the Cross and
Thomas Merton, of unifying with God by participation, is very significant.
Indeed, it is nothing less than key to the view of mystical union that we
will go on to elaborate and defend: namely, the conception of mystical
union as cognitive participation. Now in suggesting that mystical union can
reasonably be analyzed in this manner, I am contending that, in any actual
cases of mystical union, the relevant "mystics" -by virtue of God's Power
and Grace-would be treated (to the fullest extent conceptually possible
for a finite or created self) to a taste of God's omniscient cognition of the
whole of things. Further, it seems that this conception of mystical union as
participation-in-Divine-Cognition explains very well-and it is this in which
its rational respectability consists-the strong and long-standing tendency
of many distinguished theistic mystics-no less than of their Eastern and
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more "pantheistic" counterparts-to maintain that undifferentiated unity
constitutes the conspicuous phenomenological feature of their most spiritually telling mystical states. Let us, then, proceed to flesh-out what I take
to be this very important notion of cognitive participation.

v
As William James observes,18
It is a commonplace of metaphysics that God's knowledge cannot be

discursive but must be intuitive, that is, must be constructed more
after the pattern of what in ourselves is called immediate feeling,
than after that of proposition and judgment.
Why is this so? Well, it can readily be seen to constitute an epistemological ramification of the canonical doctrine that the Divine Nature must be
entirely noncomposite,19 i.e., God's perfect simplicity dictates that His
knowledge cannot be partitioned in any way.20 Accordingly, God must
know all that there is to know by one grand comprehensive and seamless
(or unparsed) intuition. Thus, any distinction drawn between His attributes and His essence must be entirely nominal: it could hardly constitute a real
distinction. Thus Mairnonides: " ... His knowledge is His essence, and His
essence is His knowledge."21 Aquinas agrees completely: " ... His act of
understanding must be His essence and His being."22 Moreover, as
Aquinas goes on to state,23
... the species of the divine intellect, which is God's essence, suffices
to manifest all things. Hence, by understanding His essence, God
knows the essences of all things, and whatever can be added to them.
Hence, since God's perfect simplicity requires, as pointed out above by
Maimonides and Aquinas, that there can be no real distinction between His
knowledge and His essence, God's knowledge could not fail to have the
undifferentiated unity of His essence.
Accordingly, we need hardly resort to the extreme conception of "mystical union" -that of complete ontological dissolution of the relevant finite
self into the Limitless Plenitiude Who is God-to account for the profound or overwhelming sense of "undifferentiated unity" reported by so
many theistic mystics as the conspicuous feature of their unitive mystical
states. Indeed, we have seen (in part IV) that the extreme conception gives
very serious indication of being theistically and phenomenologically
unacceptable. Rather, the profound sense of "undifferentiated unity"
reported by theistic mystics is very well accounted for by our conception
of mystical union as participation-in-Divine-Cognition, i.e., it is precisely
what one would expect if mystical union is analyzable in this way. In precisely this regard, it seems to me that there is remarkable insight in the following passage from Philip H. Wicksteed's book The Religion of Time and
the Religion of Eternity:24
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For the medieval saint believed that to see God is to see as God sees,
and that just in so far as we rise into true communion with him and
do in truth see God, so far shall we see things not in their fragmentary imperfections, but in their combined perfectedness ... thus when
the supreme vision is granted to Dante, and he lifts his mortal eyes to
look into the light of God, he sees all things .. .as a single perfect whole.
We are now positioned to appreciate that there could be no veridical state
of mystical union (interpreted, of course, as seeing as God sees) that would
fail to be veridical essentially. Accordingly, no veridical state of mystical
union could possibly have a phenomenological imposter. It is not terribly difficult to ascertain exactly why this is so.
VI

Our fundamental argument here is as follows: (1) Any veridical state of
mystical union (or seeing as God sees) would be one in which the relevant
mystic was elevated to-treated by God to-what can be called an optimally veridical apprehension of the domain of Nature or Creation.25 (2) No optimally veridical apprehension of the domain of Nature or Creation, could
fail to be veridical essentially. Conclusion: No veridical state of mystical
union could possibly have a phenomenological imposter. Clearly, these
premises require justification. Let us begin, appropriately, with premise (1).
Since it is unproblematic that God is a perfect Knower and perfect
Observer, it is very hard to see how there could possibly be a more accurate
view of Creation than the God's-eye view of Creation. Alternatively, how
could there fail to be less than ideal or strict congruence between the ontologically ultimate character of the cosmos and the way in which the cosmos
is apprehended by God? However, since His perfect simplicity-which, of
course, is a specification or expression of His overall perfection--ciictates
that God sees all of Creation as a single or unified Object, it is very hard to
see how could it fail to be the case that-in the final analysis-Creation
actually constitutes a single or unified Object.
Thus, traditional theists have serious warrant for subscribing to what
can be called Minimal Ontological Pluralism (MOP). According to MOP,
there are ultimately just two (concrete) objects: One that (or Who) is
Limitless in all respects and the finite or dependent object that is the cosmos or domain of Creation. And, of course, it is central to traditional theism that this latter object owes its existence and perdurance to the former
object. (Intriguingly, a number of distinguished philosophical theists from
centuries past have subscribed to MOP, or at least to something very close
to it-though not, presumably, for the reasons being urged here. The
important Jewish medieval philosopher Gersonides maintains that " ... the
world as a whole constitutes one individual."26 And Leibniz, remarkablysince we tend to think of him as our pluralist par excellence on the issue of
substance by virtue of his Monadology·-states the following:27
.. .it must be known that all things are connected in each of the possible
worlds: the universe, what ever it may be, is all ofa piece, like an ocean.)
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Now it should be clear that MOP does not require the nonexistence of variety or plurality in the domain of Creation. Rather, there are clearly diverse
aspects or modifications (e.g., planets, trees, persons) of the single object that
is the cosmos. These aspects or modifications exist, of course (wrinkles in
carpets are not illusions), but not as objects in their own right: not, strictly
speaking, as proper parts of the cosmos.
An analogy to moderate scientific realism may be helpful here.
According to the latter, what is ontologically basic or ultimately real are the
micro-particles postulated by contemporary physical theory. This should
not, however, be taken to imply that the macroscopic objects of ordinary
sense-perception constitute illusions. Rather, moderate scientific realism (in
contradistinction to the extreme or eliminative version of that doctrine) constitutes a reductive analysis of macroscopic objects. Thus, the latter objects
can properly be regarded as objects of veridical perception even though what
is ontologically basic or ultimately real is not macroscopic. Analogously,
MOP should not be taken to imply that the seemingly obvious diversity or
plurality in the domain of Creation is illusory. Rather, what is implied by
MOP is that this diversity or plurality ultimately reduces to the qualitatively
and numerically unified object that is the cosmos.
Thus, the central point: since the God's-eye view of the domain of
Creation could not fail to constitute an optimally veridical apprehension of
that domain (of the cosmos), to be in a mystical state that consists in seeing
as God sees would be to participate in an optimally veridical apprehension
of the domain of Creation.
On, now, to our justification for that important second premise of the
argument spelled out at the beginning of this section. Why should it be
held that any case of seeing as God sees-any optimally veridical apprehension of the domain of Creation-would have to be veridical essentially, i.e.,
could not conceivably have a phenomenological imposter? Well, consider:
since any optimally veridical apprehension of God's Creation (or the cosmos) can take place only by virtue of the relevant mystic's participating in,
or being in epistemic alignment with, God's apprehension of the domain of
Creation, the notion that such an optically veridical apprehension could
conceivably be veridical accidentally-could conceivably have a phenomenological imposter-has a patently absurd entailment. That is, since God's
optimally veridical monistic grasp of all things takes place by virtue of His
perfectly simple intuition of His Essence, His simple grasp of the Whole of
Creation could be veridical accidentally only if there is a possible world at
which God's "simple grasp of His Essence" and thus "His simple grasp of
the Whole of Creation" is deceptive, but has precisely the qualitative nature
of what is in fact His veridical simple apprehension of His Essence, and,
accordingly, of the Whole of Creation. Clearly, however, there is no such
possible world. It is conceptually impossible for a necessarily perfect Being,
hence a necessarily perfect Knower, to have any deceptive apprehensions at
all. Accordingly, God's optimally veridical grasp of the domain of Creation
could not fail to be veridical essentially, and, accordingly, could not possibly have a phenomenological imposter. Thus, it seems clear that premise (2) of
the argument set forth at the beginning of this section has been secured.
Therefore: any veridical state of mystical union (as interpreted and defend-
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ed), i.e., any optimally veridical apprehension of the domain of Creationor seeing as God sees-could not fail to be veridical essentially: could not
possibly have a phenomenological imposter.
Now it is important for the following to be clear: nothing that has been
argued even begins to imply that there cannot be deceptive states of "mystical union." There can indeed be such states, and it seems eminently plausible to maintain that there have been-and will continue to be-deceptive
states of that sort, i.e., mystical perceptions that seem to their phenomenological subjects to constitute bona fide states of mystical union, but in fact
are deceptive. Surely, however, this hardly vititates the point that there can
be veridical states of mystical union to which veridicality was essential. The
crucial finding, then, is this: no veridical state of mystical union--{)r so it is
rationally respectable to believ~ould conceivably be phenomenologically
identical to any deceptive state of "mystical union." Alternatively, no deceptive state of "mystical union" could possibly be a phenomenological imposter
of any veridical state of mystical union.
So: there is ample warrant for maintaining that the PIP, by virtue of
entailing that there cannot be veridical perceptual states (sensory or mystical) to which veridical was essential, deserves to be rejected as a postulate
that is universally applicable to perceptual states. It may, of course, be the
case that the PIP is applicable to perceptual states in general-to the vast
majority of perceptual states. Indeed, our argument would not be vitiated
in the least even if (as hardly seems implaUSible) the PIP is applicable to all
sensory states (a view on which I have taken no position in this essay).
VII

The task remaining, then, is to establish that our overall argumentation
heretofore (assuming its success) suffices to ensure the rational respectability of the Doctrine of Transparent Veridicality (the DTV). What is the warrant
for the transition from essential veridicality to transparent veridicality? Why
is it proper to hold that the veridicality of any perceptual state to which
veridicality was essential--{)f any perceptual state that could not possibly be
deceptive-would be immediately apparent to its phenomenological subject?
Well, consider: for the remarkably vast number of veridical perceptual
states the veridicality of which is "garden-variety" or accidental, the veridicality of such states is clearly extra-phenomenological. Alternatively, since
veridical perceptual states that are veridical accidentally could conceivably
have been phenomenological imposters, no accidentally veridical perceptual state could be such that its veridicality was partially constitutive of its
phenomenological content. However, any veridical perceptual state to
which veridicality was essential could not fail to be radically different in this
regard: how could the veridicality of any perceptual state that could not
conceivably have been a phenomenological imposter fail to be intra-phenomenological?
Consider for the moment true propositions that are true accidentally (i.e.,
contingently true propositions). Clearly, the truth of such propositions is
extra-propositional, i.e., the truth of any such proposition clearly fails to be
partially constitutive of it. However, this could hardly be the case regarding
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true propositions that are true essentially, e.g., Triangles have fewer sides than
squares. Since no false proposition could conceivably be identical to it, it is
hard to see how its truth could possibly fail to be intra-propositional, and,
accordingly, partially constitutive of that proposition. Hence, just as truth is
partially constitutive of any proposition to which it is essential, why is it not
tenable to maintain that veridicality would be partially constitutive of any
perceptual state to which it was essential? However, it seems clear that rational and attentive phenomenological subjects are immediately aware of
every feature that their respective perceptual states incorporate. For example, suppose that John is seeing the full moon. Accordingly, the phenomenological content of his perceptual state is made up (chiefly if not exhaustively) of whiteness, roundness, and luminosity. Surely, there is something
very odd about the claim that, while John is immediately aware of (say)
roundness and luminosity, he is simply unaware of whiteness. If it should
happen that John has no awareness of whiteness, the proper inference is
not that there is a component of his phenomenological content of which he
is unaware, but, rather, that whiteness is not a component of his phenomenological content. Thus, there is ample justification for holding that any
perceptual state which enjoyed the distinction of being veridical essentially
would be such that its phenomenological subject would be immediately
aware of its veridicality, i.e., such that its veridicality would be transparent
to its phenomenological subject.
Thus, we can end just where we began: with the remarkable observation
from Thomas Merton that nothing other than God
can produce even a plausible imitation of true mystical union... anyone who has experienced true mystical union can see at once the infinite distance that lies between it and the false article ... Why should it
not be held that what Merton has urged here, and, accordingly, the
DTV, is rationally respectable?

EPILOGUE
Our argument in no way suggests that persons other than the relevant mystics have an obligation of some sort to accept the mystical states in question
as veridical-let alone as transparently veridical by virtue of being veridical
essentially. However, what has usually been alleged by the many opponents
of the DTV is the much stronger claim that the relevant mystics themselves
are not entitled to regard their mystical-union states as "authoritative in an
objective sense" (as per Mackie, end-note #4). If our argument has succeeded, however, this time-honored allegation is very questionable indeed.

University of Missouri
NOTES
1. Thomas Merton, The Ascent to Truth (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1951, 1979), P.70. (Italics mine.)
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2 "Perception" will generally be used as a success word, while putative
perception will normally be indicated by the phrase "perceptual state."
Perceptual states can, of course, be mystical (or transcendental) as well as sensory. I shall often use the expression "mystical state" as a shorthand for "perceptual state of the mystical variety."
3 Cf., e.g., William Alston's brilliant treatment of the topic in Perceiving
God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1991).
4 Cf. J. 1. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982),
p.124 ..
5 This is not the first time I have tried to establish this. In prior work, I
have defended something very close to (if indeed not equivalent to) the DTV.
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